Mistral: anybody want a LHA?

France may sell the Mistrals,  two helicopter carriers built for Russia, to another country. Canada and Singapore have been mooted, as has Egypt which has just bought French fighter jets and naval frigates.
Russia says they cannot be sold on because the carriers were built to specific Russian navy requirements and therefore it was a "matter of state security."   At present the delivery of the ships remains indefinitely suspended rather than formally canceled, part of the sanctions for the seizure of Crimea from Ukraine.   France currently operates 3 Mistral Class LHDs, after buying a 3rd using economic stimulus funds. Unlike other LHD designs, the Mistral Class can’t operate fixed wing aircraft, and some classify it as an LHA.

[February 7 French sale to Moscow of two "Mistral" class warships:conditions "aren't right"]
French officials announced February 4 that France would not deliver the Mistral-class ship, part of a $1.7 billion weapons deal, saying that the conditions "aren't right," despite a possible cease-fire in Ukraine.

[July 30 2014 EU sanctions to allow French sale to Moscow of two "Mistral" class warships]

Majed and Randy

In a rare five-way teleconference on Monday evening, the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and the US discussed some key principles, such as only targeting future contracts. This would allow existing deals, like the French sale to Moscow of two "Mistral" class warships or the hundreds of existing British delivery permits, to go ahead.   

 Japan’s Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera met with his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian in Tokyo and “expressed strong concern” about France’s continued plan to sell helicopter carriers to Russia, given the potential impact it could have on East Asian security. Onodera used almost uncharacteristically strong language, saying “‘Strong concern’, in a sense, means we want them to stop the deal,” and that “the world is highly concerned about Ukraine and we are worried about the recent military buildup in Russia’s Far East. If the ship is deployed to its namesake, that would be something that makes the whole world concerned.”

Onodera is concerned about the helicopter carrier being “deployed to its namesake” in Vladivostok. Japan is also possibly worried about a strategic shift on the part of Russia to East Asia. This type of hardware in the eastern theater would at least indicate a shift in Russian tactical capability, as well as signal its intent to focus on East Asia, where it finds itself less encumbered by hostile neighbors and more readily able to do business with countries like North Korea, which is looking to balance against its over dependence on China, or China, which has no strategic interest in seeing the U.S. emboldened in East Asia by an isolated Russia. While both Japan and the U.S. have substantial military assets, a strategic shift east by Russia could potentially change the regional power balance, especially if ties with China continue to warm.

Details of further European sanctions were scheduled to be published in full on Wednesday. 

[ July 25 EU drafting stepped up sanctions against defense trade]

European Union ambassadors reached a preliminary deal July 25 on stepped-up sanctions against Russia,trade in the defense sector, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies.

earlier:

Official Journal of the European Union

L 183/9

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 692/2014

of 23 June 2014

concerning restrictions on the import into the Union of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 215 thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP (1) concerning restrictions on goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol,

Having regard to the joint proposal of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the European Commission,

Whereas:

(1)

At its meeting of 20-21 March 2014, the European Council strongly condemned the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (‘Crimea’) and the city of Sevastopol (‘Sevastopol’) to the Russian Federation and emphasised that it will not recognise the annexation. The European Council asked the Commission to evaluate the legal consequences of that annexation and to propose economic, trade and financial restrictions regarding Crimea for rapid implementation.

(2)

In its Resolution of 27 March 2014, the United Nations General Assembly affirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, underscoring the invalidity of the referendum held in Crimea on 16 March, and called upon all States not to recognise any alterations in the status of Crimea and of Sevastopol.

(3)

On 23 June 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/386/CFSP concerning restrictions on goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol and on the provision, directly or indirectly, of financing or financial assistance, as well as insurance and reinsurance, related to the import of such goods, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. In order to minimise the effect of such restrictive measures on economic operators, exceptions and transitional periods should be provided for in respect of trade in goods and related services for which transactions are required by a trade contract or ancillary contract, subject to a notification procedure.

(4)

These measures fall within the scope of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, therefore, notably with a view to ensuring their uniform application in all Member States, regulatory action at the level of the Union is necessary in order to implement them.

(5)

In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force on the day following that of its publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(a)

‘claim’ means any claim, whether asserted by legal proceedings or not, made before or after 25 June 2014, under or in connection with a contract or transaction, and includes in particular:

(i)

a claim for performance of any obligation arising under or in connection with a contract or transaction;

(ii)

a claim for extension or payment of a bond, financial guarantee or indemnity of whatever form;

(iii)

a claim for compensation in respect of a contract or transaction;

(iv)

a counterclaim;

(v)

a claim for the recognition or enforcement, including by the procedure of exequatur, of a judgment, an arbitration award or an equivalent decision, wherever made or given;

(b)

‘contract or transaction’ means any transaction of whatever form, whatever the applicable law, and whether comprising one or more contracts or similar obligations made between the same or different parties; for this purpose ‘contract’ includes a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, and credit, whether legally independent or not, as well as any related provision arising under, or in connection with, the transaction;

(c)

‘goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol’ means goods which are wholly obtained in Crimea or in Sevastopol or which have undergone their last substantial transformation there, in accordance, mutatis mutandis, with Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (2);

(d)

‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace.

(e)

‘competent authorities’ means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in the Annex.

Article 2

It shall be prohibited:

(a)

to import into the European Union goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol;

(b)

to provide, directly or indirectly, financing or financial assistance as well as insurance and reinsurance related to the import of the goods referred to in point (a).

Article 3

The prohibitions in Article 2 shall not apply in respect of:

(a)

the execution until 26 September 2014, of trade contracts concluded before 25 June 2014, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, provided that the natural or legal persons, entity or body seeking to perform the contract have notified, at least 10 working days in advance, the activity or transaction to the competent authority of the Member State in which they are established.

(b)

goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol which have been made available to the Ukrainian authorities for examination, for which compliance with the conditions conferring entitlement to preferential origin has been verified in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 374/2014 (3) or in accordance with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Article 4

It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions laid down in Article 2.

Article 5

Actions by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies shall not give rise to any liability of any kind on their part if they did not know, and had no reasonable cause to suspect, that their actions would infringe the measures set out in this Regulation.

Article 6

1.   No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, particularly a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:

(a)

designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014;

(b)

any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a);

(c)

any natural or legal person, entity or body which has been found by an arbitral, judicial or administrative decision to have infringed the prohibitions set out in this Regulation;

(d)

any natural or legal person, entity or body, if the claim relates to goods the import of which is prohibited under Article 2.

2.   In any proceedings for the enforcement of a claim, the onus of proving that satisfying the claim is not prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be on the natural or legal person, entity or body seeking the enforcement of that claim.

3.   This Article is without prejudice to the right of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 to judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation.

Article 7

1.   The Commission and the Member States shall inform each other of the measures taken under this Regulation and share any other relevant information at their disposal in connection with this Regulation, in particular information in respect of violation and enforcement problems and judgments handed down by national courts.

2.   The Member States shall immediately inform each other and the Commission of any other relevant information at their disposal which might affect the effective implementation of this Regulation.

Article 8

1.   Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2.   Member States shall notify the rules referred to in paragraph 1 to the Commission without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

Article 9

1.   Member States shall designate the competent authorities referred to in this Regulation and identify them on the websites listed in the Annex. Member States shall notify the Commission of any changes in the addresses of their websites listed in the Annex.

2.   Member States shall notify the Commission of their competent authorities, including the contact details of those competent authorities, without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation, and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.

3.   Where this Regulation sets out a requirement to notify, inform or otherwise communicate with the Commission, the address and other contact details to be used for such communication shall be those indicated in the Annex.

Article 10

This Regulation shall apply:

(a)

within the territory of the Union, including its airspace;

(b)

on board any aircraft or any vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State;

(c)

to any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State;

(d)

to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State;

(e)

to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union.

Article 11

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Luxembourg, 23 June 2014.

For the Council

The President

C. ASHTON

On 4 July 2014, the EU published an amendment, adding the wording underlined below to Article 3(b) of Regulation 692/2014, thereby clarifying the scope of this exception:

"The prohibitions…shall not apply in respect of:… goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol which have been made available to the Ukrainian authorities for examination, for which compliance with the conditions conferring entitlement to preferential origin has been verified and for which a certificate of origin has been issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 and Regulation (EU) No 374/2014 (2) or in accordance with the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement."

UKBIS has clarified that this means that goods from Crimea/ Sevastopol which are accompanied by a valid certificate of origin from a Ukrainian authority may be imported into the EU. There is no separate requirement that the goods be presented to the Ukrainian authorities for inspection.

EUR1 and GSP certificates issued by the Crimean Chamber of Commerce or its branches, or the Sevastopol Chamber of Commerce will not meet the requirements of Art 3(b).

February 3 2012

Chariot: SVG-flag arms ship heading to Levant?

Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said an embargo on arms supplies to Syria is out of the question – along with any resolution that could threaten to aggravate conflict in the country.

Churkin, speaking to journalists via video link, spoke out strongly against a possible arms embargo on Syria, citing some countries' refusal to condemn the armed groups operating there, and the continued risk of weapons supplies reaching these groups despite any ban.

THE Syrian port of Tartus is Russia’s only military base outside the old Soviet Union.Russia's dilemma is that too much support for Mr Assad risks a future regime booting it out of Tartus, which is valued by Russian spooks and electronic snoopers. But too little may mean defeat for an old ally.

The Iranian embassy in Ankara denied on January 12 that four trucks seized by Turkish customs were carrying military equipment from Iran to Syria. The trucks were confiscated on January 10 in Turkey's southeast province of Kilis at the Öncüpınar border crossing into Syria.

EU legislation
In response to the violent repression by Syrian government forces, the EU orignally imposed sanctions on Syria which came into force with immediate effect on 10 May 2011. The sanctions were originally detailed in Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP (published in the Official Journal of the European Union L121, 10.4.2011, p11) and Council Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 (published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L121, 10.4.2011, p1), now repealed.

These sanctions have since been consolidated and updated by new restrictive measures announced in Council Decision 2011/782/CFSP (published in the Official Journal of the European Union L319, 2.12.2011, p56). This Decision came into force on 1 December 2011. The EU have also subsequently published implementing legislation in Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012. This Regulation specifies items that are prohibited in relevant annexes.

The measures include an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban against specified individuals. They also include a prohibition on internet and telephone communications items and oil and gas goods and technology. Chariot earlier
back

Briese and Eide:big in the arms trade, report

Any ship can transport boxes of bullets or radar components; the value-add for shipping “typical” exports like guns or tanks is trustworthiness (implying connections with government officials) and general competency. A normal shipping company—i.e. one with ro-ros, container ships, etc.—seeking to enter the Russian and Ukrainian weapons market would do well to establish a relationship with Odessa companies such as Kaalbye in order to leverage their unique political connections.

The German firm Briese Schiffahrts GmbH and Co KG is another transporter of Russian and Ukrainian weapons. Based in Leer, Germany, Briese is one of the largest shipping companies in Germany and among the largest heavy-lift shippers in the world, with a fleet of over 140 ships. Heavy lift ships typically carry their own cranes, and so can move large, heavy, and unusually shaped cargo such as tanks, artillery, etc. Bulk carriers and normal cargo ships—such as those owned by Kaalbye Shipping—cannot do so. This ability becomes even more useful if the port of discharge lacks proper infrastructure for handling such bulky cargo, since the ship can use its own crane rather than relying on old or non-existent port equipment. We believe that this gives Briese (and other EU heavy-lift firms discussed later) an important functional role in the Odessa Network: heavy weapons shipments, in particular to poor-infrastructure countries. This judgment is born of empirical data.

Briese has facilitated involved transporting heavy military equipment to poor-infrastructure states. Briese ships appear to be heavily staffed with Russian and Ukrainian captains and seamen, reflecting the fact that most of Briese’s crewing business comes from Russia and Ukraine.

2 The Norwegian firm Eide Marine Services is the second most frequent weapons transporter in our dataset. Eide is one of the few firms which possesses exactly such a ship, the Eide Transporter, which has been used multiple times to move unusual Russian military cargo to foreign customers. This includes Tarantul -class missile corvettes, Gepard -class frigates, and Svetlyak -class patrol boats to Vietnam, and Kilo -class submarines to China.

The Odessa Network centers on a group of Odessa-based private companies that regularly move large arms shipments. Affiliated EU and Russian shipping firms such as Briese Schiffahrts (and its subsidiary BBC Chartering) and Balchart play an important specialized role in transporting particularly large or sensitive shipments. The network is deeply interconnected. Personnel and equipment frequently cycle between different companies, and many network members are family members, close friends, former classmates, etc. The vast majority of weapons shipments leave from the Ukrainian port of Oktyabrsk, which was specially built by the USSR to move weapons (for example, this was the point of origin for Cuba-bound missiles in 1963). Despite being located in Ukraine, Oktyabrsk is functionally controlled by Russia—the port manager is a former Russian navy captain, and the port owner is a Kremlin-linked oligarch. Russian state weapons export agencies and Odessa Network firms maintain offices and personnelin Oktyabrsk.
more [September 7 2013]

A new study by independent conflict researchers describes a heavy volume of traffic in the past two years from Ukraine’s Oktyabrsk port, just up the Black Sea coast from Odessa, to Syria’s main ports on the Mediterranean. The dozens of ships making the journey ranged from smaller Syrian- and Lebanese-flagged vessels to tanker-size behemoths with a long history of hauling weapons cargos.Despite being in Ukraine, Oktyabrsk “is functionally controlled by Russia,” and the port is headed by a former Russian navy captain and owned by a business magnate with close ties to the Kremlin, the report said. Major Russian weapons exporters have offices there, alongside Ukrainian and Russian shipping and logistics companies the report has dubbed the “Odessa Network.”
http://www.c4ads.org/

Lugela: pirates abandon, crew retakes ship

Crew of a Greek ship which was hijacked deep in the Indian Ocean on Saturday are once again in control of the vessel.

The circumstances of the retaking of the 4,281-dwt Lugela (built 1984)remain a mystery, however, but engine failure is said to have played a part.The ship's all-Ukrainian crew are safe.
The Greek operator received a call from the master of the Panama-flagged ship Sep. 26 to say that the crew was back in control of the vessel.

Lugela IMO: 8410380 (Ex: Thor Sofia) 4,145 DWT, Multi-Purpose, Built 1984
Owners/Managers are TDM Carriers, Panama Flagged.

6.9 knots Panamanian vessel hijacked in Gulf of Aden

The Malaspina Castle, was hijacked April 6 in the Gulf of Aden, carrying iron and had 24 people on board from Bulgaria, the Philippines, Russia and Ukraine.

MALASPINA CASTLE
former ADVENTURE / VENTURE STAR
Vessel's Details:
Ship Type: Cargo
Year Built: 1981
Length x Breadth: 183m X 28m
DeadWeight: 32587 MT
Speed recorded (Max / Average): 8.2 / 6.9 knots
Flag: Panama [PA]
since 2005 Feb 04 GREECE
since 1994 Feb 01 LIBERIA
Call Sign: 3EJN8
IMO: 7915967, MMSI: 372574000

USN inspected pirates' small boats & released

On February 5, U.S. seamen inspected the pirates' boats to ensure they weren't carrying any of the mv Faina's weapons cargo.
But the Navy did not take action against the pirates because they still hold many hostages from other ships, said Cmdr. Jane Campbell, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Navy's Bahrain-based 5th Fleet.

Belize mv Faina gets pirates 3.2 mil by airmail

According to businessmen on shore, the ransom was around $3 million and the money was dropped by parachute from a small plane, which seems to be the new way to deliver pirate booty. The weather was bad, said Dryad Maritime Intelligence Service Ltd.
According to witnesses in Hin-Barwaaqo, the fishing village near where the Faina has been anchored, a band of pirates left the ship on Thursday with seven Russian-style machine guns.

It’s unclear what will happen with the arsenal on board. The Kenyan government says it is theirs but the pirates and Western officials in the region have said the arms were destined for a former rebel army in southern Sudan and Kenya was simply the transit point. Kenya uses many American and British weapons, which is why it seemed strange that the Kenyan military would suddenly switch to Eastern-bloc gear.

Release of Belize-flag MV Faina?

A deal has been reached for the release by Somali pirates of a Ukrainian-owned ship, seized in the Gulf of Aden more than two months ago, carrying a controversial cargo of 33 Russian T-72 tanks. A "few technicalities" remain.
The arrangement to release the MV Faina and its 17-member crew came after protracted negotiations as the vessel, anchored off the Somali port of Hardhere, was surrounded by US Navy and other warships.

Panamanian-flag chemical carrier hijacked

The Chemstar Venus was seized by pirates on 16 November 08 off Somalia.


The vessel is operated by Japan’s Kaiun Kaisha, classed by ClassNK and insured through the Japan Shipowners’ Protection and Indemnity Association.

Japan’s foreign ministry confirmed the Panama-flagged vessel, which was on a voyage from Dumai, Indonesia to the Ukraine,
Name: Chemstar Venus
MMSI: 357280000 [PA]
IMO: 9185841
Callsign: 3FEX9
Speed/Dir: 12.5 kts / 253° WSW
Status: Underway
Dest:
ETA:
Type: Tanker Haz A (81)
Details: Chemical / Oil Products Tanker
Size: 148m x 24m x 9.4m
Tonnage: 11951gt, 19455dwt
Built: Feb 1999

british private security guards have repulsed a Somali pirate attack on an unidentified chemical tanker, using equipment billed as the sonic equivalent of a laser, according to the principal of a company that specialises in such services, some say.

MV Faina Crew Okay

Crew of MV Faina, The Belize-flagged cargo ship, owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping, Ukraine

Images around Faina

Faina surrounded

USS Howard

Belize-flag mv Faina, hijacked by pirates, now surrounded by naval vessels

Details of MV Faina, hijacked with 33 russian tanks

MV FAINA

Belize flag but is managed by the Ukrainian company Tomax Team Inc

details

IMO NUMBER 7419377
VESSEL TYPE RO-RO CARGO
HULL TYPE DOUBLE HULL
GROSS TONNAGE 10.931 tons
SUMMER DWT 9.019 tons
BUILD 1978
BUILDER LODOSE VARV LODOSE - SWEDEN
FLAG BELIZE
MANAGER TOMEX TEAM ODESSA - UKRAINE
OWNER WATERLUX PANAMA
VESSEL DETAILS
CLASSIFICATION KM* L3
LAST->
SPECIAL SURVEY 2008 Aug 01
GENERIC
SPEED 15,0 knots
DIMENSIONS ->
BREADTH EXTREME 18,03 m
BREADTH MOULDED 18,03 m
DEPTH 13,35 m
DRAUGHT 6,72 m
FREEBOARD 6.640,0 mm
LENGTH->
B/W PERPENDICULARS 152,50 m
LENGTH OVERALL 161,37 m
LENGTH REGISTERED 161,40 m
TONNAGES
NET TONNAGE 3.280 tons
LOADLINE
DISPLACEMENT->
(SUMMER) 13.650 tons
CAPACITIES
BALLAST 3.565 tons
BUNKER 525,00 tons
FUEL OIL 900,00 tons
CARGO
CARGO HOLDS 1*6550 m3
1*10025 m3
STRUCTURE
BULKHEADS 5
DECKS
NUMBER 2
ENGINE
ENGINE # 2
ENGINE TOTAL POWER 7.654 KW
PROPELLER 2-FIXED PITCHED SOLID PROPELLER
COMMUNICATION
CALL SIGN V3EZ2
HISTORICAL INFO
PLACE OF BUILT SWEDEN
YARD NUMBER 179
HISTORICAL INFO
FORMER NAMES
since 2007 Apr 23 MARABOU
since 2003 Apr 27 LOVERVAL
since 1985 Nov 18 MATINA
since 1983 May 30 VALLMO
FORMER FLAGS
since 1996 Aug 06 PANAMA
since 1991 Jul 19 LUXEMBOURG
since 1991 Mar 26 BELGIUM
since 1983 May 30 SWEDEN

SOMALIA
Pirates are believed to be using “mother vessels” to launch attacks far from the coast. These “mother vessels” proceed far out to sea and launch smaller boats to attack and hijack passing ships. Eastern and Northeastern coasts are high risk areas for attacks and hijackings